As noted in Atty Gen. Op. No. 89-IO06, which dealt with the same issues relating to 6 Del. C. ch. 46 (housing discrimination), the Commission is a creature of statute. It has such powers as are specifically enumerated or necessarily implied from the enabling statute. Maxwell v. Vetter, Del. Super., 311 A.2d 864 (1973); Wilmington Vitamin and Cosmetic Corp. v. Tigue, Del. Super., 183 A.2d 731 (1967). The Commission's authority should be construed so as to effectuate the legislative intent. Atlantis I Condominium Ass'n v. Bryson, Del. Super., 403 A.2d 711, 713 (1979).
The purpose of 6 Del. C. ch. 45, entitled "Equal Accommodations," is to eliminate discrimination with regard to defined places of public accommodation. It is expressly intended that the chapter be "liberally construed" to "effectively safeguard[]" all persons' rights to full and equal accommodations. 6 Del. C. § 4502.
The provisions of this chapter were interpreted two years after the issuance of Atty Gen. Op. No. 89-IO06, in Miller v. Spicer, Del. Supr., 602 A.2d 65 (1991). The plaintiff there sought to bring a private cause of action in U.S. District Court based upon this statute. The federal court certified to the
|
|